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1. Introduction 
Animals show impulsiveness when they prefer an immedi-
ate food reinforcer even though a more delayed alternative 
yields a higher rate of food intake. This preference for im-
mediacy could have important implications for behavioral 
models of cooperation, like the famous Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, which focus on situations in which defecting (that 
is, not cooperating) leads to an immediate gain. Indeed some 
workers have argued that exhibiting self-control rather than 
impulsiveness is almost identical to cooperating rather than 
defecting (Platt, 1973; Rachlin, 2000, 2002). To cooperate in 
situations like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, animals must forego 
the immediate temptation to defect in anticipation of a larger 
stream of gains in the long run. Since, by definition, impul-
sive animals prefer immediate rewards, strong impulsive-
ness may present a significant barrier to cooperation.  
Beyond this theoretical link, there is an intriguing empiri-
cal parallel between impulsiveness and cooperation. In both 
topics, human and non-human results disagree. Experiments 
suggest that non-human animals are much more impulsive 
than humans (Mazur, 1987; Rachlin et al., 1991; Richards et 
al., 1997), and much less likely to cooperate in experimental 
games (Clements and Stephens, 1995; Sally, 1995). This cor-
relation agrees with our predictions: subjects that are more 
impulsive should be less cooperative (see Harris and Mad-
den, 2002 for evidence of this correlation in human subjects). 
However, we must view this correlation with some caution 
because human and non-human studies use quite different 
procedures (Jackson and Hackenberg, 1996).  
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Abstract 
Animals show impulsiveness when they prefer a smaller more immediate option, even though a larger more delayed 
option produces a higher intake rate. This impulsive behavior has implications for several behavioral problems in-
cluding social cooperation. This paper presents two experiments using captive blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) that con-
sider the effects of payoff accumulation and temporal clumping on impulsiveness and cooperation. Payoff accumu-
lation refers to a situation where the benefits gained from each choice trial accumulate from one trial to the next, and 
only become available to the animal after it has completed a fixed number of trials. We hypothesized that this would 
reduce impulsiveness because it removes the advantage of quickly realizing food gains. Clumping refers to situa-
tion in which the animal experiences several choice trials in quick succession followed by a long pause before the next 
clump. We hypothesized that if payoffs accumulated over a clump of trials this would enhance the effect of accumula-
tion. We tested the effects of accumulation and clumping on impulsiveness in a self-control situation. We found a sig-
nificant interaction between clumping and accumulation. Payoff accumulation reduced impulsiveness, but only when 
trials were clumped. Post hoc analyses suggest that clumping alone increases impulsiveness. A second experiment ap-
plied these results to cooperation. This experiment reveals an interaction between payoff accumulation and trial’s po-
sition within the clump. Jays were more likely to cooperate on the first trial of a clump, but the likelihood of cooper-
ation dropped after the first trial. However, this drop was larger when payoffs did not accumulate. This observation 
suggests that the difference between accumulated and unaccumulated treatments that we reported previously (Science 
198: 2216–2218) may be largely due to differences in how animals behave in the first trial of a clump. 
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Our goal was to investigate the idea that strong impul-
siveness in animals prevents cooperation in experimen-
tal Prisoner’s Dilemmas. To test this, one would like some 
manipulation or treatment that switches impulsiveness off. 
With such a treatment, we should be able to show that an-
imals cooperate in a Prisoner’s Dilemma when we experi-
mentally “switch off” their impulsiveness, but defect oth-
erwise. The difficulty here is that we know relatively little 
about the causes of impulsiveness, although the literature 
gives several examples of impulsiveness varying across 
contexts in both humans and non-humans (Mazur, 1994; 
Mischel et al., 1989; Stephens and Anderson, 2001; Stephens 
and McLinn, 2003; Wilson and Daly, 2004). A manipulation 
that should, in theory, have a large effect on impulsiveness is 
payoff accumulation (Stephens, 2000). 
1.1. Accumulation 
In a typical choice experiment, an animal makes a choice and 
receives the benefits of its decision, and this pattern of choice 
and reward continues over many trials. Imagine instead that 
the benefits of each choice accumulate over a sequence of 
trials, becoming available for collection only after the sub-
ject completes four trials (for example). If impulsiveness oc-
curs because more immediate reinforcers are more valuable, 
then payoff accumulation should reduce or eliminate impul-
siveness because it eliminates the advantage of immediacy. 
There should be no advantage to choosing the more imme-
diate option because the subject must wait for all its accu-
mulated gains. We present two experimental studies that 
explore the potential of accumulation to influence impulsive-
ness. The first experiment directly asks whether accumula-
tion reduces impulsiveness, and the second asks whether ac-
cumulation increases cooperativeness. 
1.2. Clumping 
When we say that the bushes in a garden are clumped, we 
mean that several bushes are clustered together and clearly 
separated from other clumps. By analogy, this paper re-
fers to events that are clumped in time. When events are 
clumped in time, groups of events occur in quick succes-
sion, but relatively long intervals separate one group from 
another. We reasoned that if some process created tempo-
ral clumps of trials, this would make accumulation more evi-
dent to the subjects, and possibly enhance accumulation’s ef-
fect on impulsivity. The rationale of this claim is that when 
trials are clumped and accumulated the subject experiences a 
quick sequence of trials separated by a long interval, collect-
ing reinforcement after every clump of trials. The long gap 
between clumps should make it easier to recognize clumps 
of trials, and we reason that it may also make it easier to rec-
ognize that payoff accumulation combines the benefits de-
rived from these clumps. In contrast, if accumulated trials 
were equally spaced in time, this may blur the distinction be-
tween one set of accumulated trials and the next, and so pos-
sibly reduce the effect of accumulation. Our first experiment 
factorially combined accumulated and unaccumulated treat-
ments with clumped and unclumped treatments using a con-
ventional impulsiveness test. This experiment offered sub-
jects a choice between a small immediate and a large delayed 
option using an experimental situation that psychologists 
call the self-control paradigm. 
Experiment 2 applied the results of experiment 1 to co-
operation by testing blue jays in an experimental Prison-
er’s Dilemma with and without accumulation. We reported 
the main effects of accumulation on cooperation elsewhere 
(Stephens et al., 2002). Here, we focus on patterns related to 
clumping that we have not reported previously. 
2. General methods 
2.1. Double-V apparatus 
The apparatus used in both experiments had two side-by-
side compartments, each shaped like a “V” (Figure 1A). Each 
compartment was equipped with three perches, one in the 
rear and two in the front. Each perch was positioned imme-
diately below a stimulus light (Med Associates ENV-124AM) 
that could display any of several colors. A microswitch con-
nected to each perch allowed the experimental program to 
detect the presence or absence of a bird. Generally speak-
ing, the subject waited on the rear perch when the associated 
rear light illuminated, and hopped forward to make a choice 
when the front lights illuminated. 
The front panel of each compartment was also equipped 
with a food cup, a 20-mg pellet feeder (Med Associates ENV-
203- 20), and a custom-made device that we call the accumu-
lator (Figure 1B). The accumulator was a small box made of 
transparent plastic. The pellet dispenser delivered pellets 
into the accumulator so that the subject could see the food 
pellets it had earned but not consume them. At experimen-
tally determined times, a flap on the bottom of the accumu-
lator opened (by energizing a solenoid), delivering food into 
the food cup. The accumulator allowed us to create treat-
ments in which food accumulated, seen but unavailable, 
over several trials, or unaccumulated treatments in which 
the apparatus dispensed food immediately at the end of a 
trial. 
2.2. Training 
Before testing subjects in either experiment, we trained them 
to perform a task we call “light following.” In light follow-
ing, the subjects waited on the rear perch for a fixed time, 
then hopped forward to the front perch associated with an il-
luminated stimulus light. Each training trial presented only 
one of the two front perches, and the order of left and right 
presentations was selected randomly. During this training, 
we trained the subject to visit both the left and right perches. 
This training used conventional shaping techniques, and 
typically took 3–4 weeks to complete. 
Subjects spent 23 h in the apparatus, obtaining all of their 
food there. We removed the subjects from the apparatus for 
1 h each day (11:00–12:00). During this break, we weighed 
the subjects, and cleaned and tested the apparatus. Experi-
mental contingencies were in force 8 h per day: starting at 
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07:00, stopping for the break at 11:00, starting again at 12:00 
and ending for the day 16:00. All stimulus lights were dark 
during the periods when contingencies were not in force. We 
provided supplementary food (at 16:00 daily) for any bird 
that obtained less than 7 g during the day. A white noise 
generator provided masking noise whenever the experimen-
tal contingencies were in force.  
2.3. Statistical methods 
Both experiments followed a within-subjects or repeated 
measures design. To assess effects of time, we divided the 
free trials into three time blocks – i.e., first third of the data, 
second third, third third – and analyzed the proportional 
choice for each third. When a plot or analysis called for a 
Figure 1. (A) Plan of apparatus. The 
apparatus consisted of side-by-side 
V-shaped compartments. Each com-
partment had three perches and three 
stimulus projectors. (B) The accumu-
lator. To create accumulated and un-
accumulated treatments, we fixed a 
transparent box to the front of each 
compartment as shown here. A stan-
dard pellet dispenser delivered food 
into this box. In accumulated treat-
ments, pellets accumulated in the box 
over several trials until we energized 
a solenoid that opened a flap at the 
bottom of the accumulator.  
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single measure of performance, we used the data from the 
last third of free trials for a given treatment. We used con-
ventional repeated measures ANOVA using arcsine trans-
formed choice proportions to analyze the data. 
3. Experiment 1 
The goal of this experiment was to determine whether and 
under what conditions accumulation and the temporal ar-
rangement of trials influence blue jay preferences for im-
mediacy. The experiment followed the self-control proce-
dure typically used in discounting studies (e.g., Rachlin and 
Green, 1972). In self-control studies, subjects must choose be-
tween a small-immediate benefit and a large-delayed benefit. 
3.1. Experiment 1—Methods 
3.1.1. Overview 
The sequence of events within a trial was as follows: (1) the 
subject waited for a fixed time (the inter-trial interval or ITI); 
(2) the apparatus offered a choice between small-immediate 
and large-delayed options by illuminating lights of different 
colors at the front of the apparatus; (3) the subject chose one 
of the options by hopping forward to the associated perch. 
Once the subject made its choice, the unchosen light was 
switched off and the experimentally programmed delay to 
food began; (4) when the programmed delay expired, the ap-
paratus dispensed food and the process began again at step 
1. In this experiment, the small-immediate option offers one 
20 mg food pellet and the large-delayed option offers three 
20 mg food pellets. The delays varied according to experi-
mental treatments as described below. 
3.1.2. Subjects 
The subjects in experiment 1 were six adult blue jays of un-
known sex and mixed experimental histories: band numbers 
b70, b85, b108, b223, b229 and b239. 
3.1.3. Stimulus colors 
We selected the light colors associated with small-immediate 
and large-delayed randomly for each subject from the set: 
yellow/ blue, blue/yellow, green/red and red/green. We 
maintained this association for each subject throughout the 
experiment. 
3.1.4. Treatments 
We organized trials into blocks of 32, the first eight tri-
als within each block were forced or “no choice” trials in 
which the subjects was offered only one option (i.e., either 
the small-immediate option or the large-delayed option, but 
not both). The remaining 24 trials were free choice trials, in 
which subjects could choose between the two options. 
3.1.5. Baseline treatments 
In order to minimize order effects, each individual expe-
rienced a baseline treatment before being tested in each 
clumping/accumulation combination. We designed the 
baseline treatment to be intermediate between the actual ex-
perimental treatments. The delay-to-large was 60 s and the 
delay-to-small was 25 s. Within this treatment, subjects ex-
perienced a random mix of all four of the accumulation/
clumping combinations. At the beginning of each set of four 
trials, the baseline program randomly determined whether 
the next four trials would be: (a) clumped or not and (b) ac-
cumulated or not. In clumped trials, the subject waited 285 s 
before being presented with a succession of four trials, one 5 
s after the other. In non-clumped trials, the subject waited 75 
s between each of the four trials. Subjects experienced 4 days 
of these baseline trials before starting each new clumping/
accumulation combination. 
3.1.6. Clumping treatments 
We arranged trials into groups of four (within the blocks of 
32 discussed above). In temporally “clumped” treatments, 
the subject experienced a 345 s inter-trial interval between 
clumps and then experienced a quick succession of four tri-
als, with a 5 s inter-trial intervals, totaling four trials every 
360 s. In unclumped trials, the subject waited 90 s between 
each trial, again experiencing four trials every 360 s. Ex-
pressing this another way, the inter-trial interval varied in 
clumped treatments (sometimes 5 s and sometimes 345 s), 
but was fixed in unclumped treatments (always 360 s). 
3.1.7. Accumulation treatments 
In accumulated treatments, food remained in the accumula-
tor – visible to the subject, but unavailable – for four trials, 
then the accumulator opened delivering food immediately 
after the fourth trial was completed. In unaccumulated treat-
ments, the accumulator opened immediately after the pellet 
dispenser delivered the last pellet of food. 
3.1.8. Delay treatments 
To assess whether our manipulations influenced the blue 
jays’ sensitivity to delay we needed to vary the delays asso-
ciated with large (three 20 mg food pellets) and small (one 
20 mg food pellet) options. Therefore, we tested each clump-
ing/accumulation combination at six different delay-to-
large/delay-to-small combinations. We tested two delays-to-
large (45 and 75 s) and three delays-to-small (5, 15 and 30 
s). Each subject, therefore, experienced 24 distinct treatments 
(two levels of accumulation, two levels of clumping, two lev-
els of delay-to-large and three levels of delay-to-small). Each 
subject experienced the four accumulation/ clumping treat-
ments in a randomly determined order. In addition, we ran-
domized the order of the six delay treatments within each 
accumulation/clumping treatment, so that a given individ-
ual experienced all six delay treatments within a given level 
of accumulation and clumping before moving on to the next, 
randomly determined, accumulation/clumping combina-
tion. Each treatment ran for 3 days. 
3.2. Experiment 1—Results 
Figure 2 shows an overview of the data. The figure shows 
proportional choice of the large-delayed alternative called 
P(Large) in the figure, for each bird and each condition of 
the experiment. It is somewhat difficult to see the patterns 
in the data in this graph, but one does see considerable indi-
vidual variability in the data. For example, we see that all in-
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dividuals are nearly indifferent in the “clumped and accu-
mulated” treatment, while there is much more variability in 
other treatments. We also see that indifference (P(Large) = 
0.5) represents an upper bound in the data; when a subject 
shows a strong preference, it is a preference for the small-im-
mediate option.  
Repeated measures analysis of variance on accumula-
tion, clumping, delay-to-small and delay-to-large treatments 
shows two significant effects: a significant accumulation–
clumping interaction (F1,5 = 9.9, p = 0.025) and a significant 
effect of delay-to-small (F2,10 = 6.87, p = 0.025). 
Figure 3 shows the pattern of the clumping-accumulation 
interaction. The “clumped and not accumulated” treatment 
shows a significant shift toward choice of the small-imme-
diate option (i.e. small P(Large)); while accumulation clearly 
makes no difference when trials are unclumped. The “accu-
mulated and clumped” appears to be slightly elevated but 
further analyses suggest that this is not significant. Post hoc 
analysis show significant differences between the “clumped 
and not accumulated” treatment and all others, but no dif-
ferences between the three remaining treatments. In addi-
tion, we observed a trend for an accumulation main effect 
(F1,5 = 5.4, p = 0.067), but we focus on the significant interac-
tion demonstrating how clumping modulates accumulation 
Figure 4 shows the significant main effect of delay-to-small; 
large delays-to-small increase proportional choice of the 
large-delayed option (P(Large)). It is somewhat surprising 
that we did not find an effect of the logically similar treat-
ment variable delay-to-large, but the range of delay-to-large 
values tested here might have been too small. 
When trials were clumped trials in time, subjects may 
have made different choices on the first and fourth trials 
within a clump. To account for this effect, we recalculated 
our analysis of variance including “clump position” as a fac-
tor. This analysis shows no effect of a trial’s position within a 
clump. A graph of P(Large) versus clump position shows no 
hint of a trend. We report this negative result because experi-
ment 2 shows a striking effect of clump position.  
Figure 2. Overview of ex-
periment 1. Each panel 
shows the relative fre-
quency with which the sub-
ject choose the large-de-
layed alternative [denoted 
by P(Large)] for each of six 
subjects as a function of the 
delay to small. These plots 
show P(Large) calculated 
from the final third of free 
trials for each treatment. The 
eight separate panels each 
show a different combina-
tion of delay to large (45 or 
75 s), clumping (clumped or 
not clumped) and accumu-
lation (accumulated or not 
accumulated).  
Figure 3. An interaction plot showing the combined effects of clump-
ing and accumulation. The whiskers show standard errors. Repeated 
measures analysis of variance showed that this interaction was signif-
icant (F1,5 = 9.9, p = 0.025). As in Figure 2, this plot summarizes data 
from the final third of free trails for each treatment. 
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The interaction between accumulation and temporal 
clumping is very intriguing (Figure 3). We introduced ac-
cumulation treatments because we hypothesized that they 
would reduce impulsiveness, and indeed, we found that 
blue jays were less likely to choose the small-immediate op-
tion in accumulated treatments, but only when we clumped 
trials in time. Our results suggest that clumping increases 
impulsiveness and accumulation reverses this effect. The 
reader should recall that we conduct our studies at a longer 
time scale than typical non-human studies of impulsiveness 
and self-control. For example, in our unclumped treatment 
subjects experienced a 90 s inter-trial interval for each trial 
over an 8 h period. 
3.3. Experiment 1—Discussion 
This unexpected role of temporal clumping is significant in 
several ways. First, temporal clumping is a new factor in 
studies of impulsivity. Variables such as the overall delay to 
reward are analogous to clumping in that they influence the 
temporal arrangement of benefits (e.g., Rachlin and Green, 
1972). Although earlier studies of impulsiveness have impli-
cated similar variables, they focus on the temporal proper-
ties of the alternatives offered (see, for example, Bateson and 
Kacelnik, 1996; Green, 2000; Mazur and Logue, 1978; Ma-
zur et al., 1985). To create clumps, we varied the temporal 
arrangement of the choices, while holding the delays and 
amounts associated with each alternative fixed. Indeed, a 
long-standing claim of the self-control literature is that the 
duration of the inter-trial interval (the time between choices) 
does not affect impulsiveness (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; 
Gallistel and Gibbon, 2000). We achieve clumping, obviously 
enough, by varying the inter-trial intervals. In unclumped 
treatments, inter-trial intervals are always the same, while 
inter-trial intervals are sometimes short and sometimes long 
in clumped treatments. So, our results suggest that variabil-
ity in the inter-trial interval may affect impulsiveness, even if 
the magnitude of the inter-trial interval does not. Although 
the generality of our clumping result needs further investi-
gation, we think it worth asking whether the short sessions 
of typical self-control studies may represent “clumps” that 
enhance impulsiveness. If so, this might partially explain 
why non-human subjects seem so absurdly impulsive. 
Our clumped treatments raise questions about how one 
should calculate the intake rates; since the rate per trial var-
ies from one trial to the next. The general discussion ad-
dresses this question, and reviews relevant literature from 
behavioral ecology. 
Many experimental studies have investigated animal im-
pulsiveness. These studies have emphasized the properties of 
the alternatives that the experiment offers the animal. For ex-
ample, an important sequence of studies shows that increas-
ing both delays (the delay-to-small and delay-to-large) by 
the same amount shifts preference toward the larger, more 
delayed alternative (Green et al., 1981; Rachlin and Green, 
1972). This preference reversal effect is one of the fundamen-
tal facts of animal impulsiveness. Similarly, several authors 
have compared randomly varying delays to fixed delays with 
the same mean duration (Mazur, 1989; Rachlin et al., 2000). In 
these experiments, animals show a preference for variable de-
lays. Students of impulsiveness see this as further evidence 
that a decreasing concave-up function governs the subjective 
value of delayed food. The clumping variable that we explore 
here is unusual because it is not a property of the alternatives 
themselves. Instead clumping refers to the arrangement of al-
ternatives in time. There has been comparatively little work 
on how such aspects of the “background” influence subjec-
tive choice. Indeed, the literature gives the overall impression 
that any “background” effects on choice and impulsiveness 
are virtually non-existent. One exception to this is Mazur’s 
(1994) demonstration that dispensing food between choices 
(i.e., within the inter-trial interval) shifts choice toward the 
small-immediate alternative. Our result shows a similar shift, 
but it is not clear that our clumping treatments represent 
background enrichment because the average long-term rate 
of intake is the same in clumped and unclumped treatments 
(see general discussion for review of rate calculations). Our 
results may be similar to Mazur’s background enrichment ef-
fect if we assume that variability in the temporal arrangement 
of the background (clumping) increases the value of the back-
ground in the same way that variability in delays to food de-
livery makes alternatives in the foreground more attractive. 
We remark, however, that our clumped treatments repre-
sent deterministic rather than stochastic variation in the back-
ground of a particular pair of alternatives. 
Payoff accumulation superficially resembles reward bun-
dling (Ainslie and Monterosso, 2003; Brunner and Gibbon, 
1995; Mazur, 1986; Mitchell and Rosenthal, 2003). In bun-
dling studies, a single choice leads to multiple delayed re-
wards, for example, a pecking a green key might lead to two 
pellets after 10 s followed by an additional two pellets af-
ter an additional 10 s. In accumulation, in contrast, subjects 
make a sequence of decisions that combine to influence the 
magnitude and timing of a single delayed reward. Qualita-
tively, bundling and accumulation appear to have similar 
effects in that they can both shift choice away from smaller 
more immediate options (Ainslie and Monterosso, 2003). 
Quantitatively, we have much more information about bun-
Figure 4. The significant effect of delay-to-small in experiment 1. Pref-
erence for the large-delayed option [P(Large)] increased when we in-
creased the delay associated with the small option (F2,10 = 6.87, p = 
0.025). As in previous figures, this plot summarizes data from the final 
third of free trails for each treatment.   
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dling, where evidence suggests that the discounted value 
of a sequence of rewards is simply of the sum of their sep-
arately discounted values (e.g., Brunner and Gibbon, 1995; 
Mazur, 1986). It is less clear how one would apply discount-
ing models to the many actions, one outcome case posed by 
accumulation. 
4. Experiment 2 
4.1. Overview 
We designed this experiment to study the interaction be-
tween discounting and opponent strategy in an Iterated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. Experiment 1 showed that accumulation in-
creased proportional choice of a large-delayed option when 
trials are clumped. We, therefore, used accumulation as a 
manipulation of impulsiveness. To manipulate strategies, 
we assigned one individual in each pair to act as a stooge. 
The stooge was trained to simply “follow lights” and in do-
ing so it could be made to follow an experimentally deter-
mined strategy. In this experiment, the stooges either recip-
rocated using the widely known tit-for-tat strategy (Axelrod 
and Hamilton, 1981) or unilaterally defected using the “all 
defect” (All-D). A player using tit-for-tat copies his oppo-
nent’s move on the previous trial: so if my opponent cooper-
ated on trial 10, I will cooperate on trial 11. 
4.2. Experiment 2—methods 
4.2.1. Subjects 
The subjects were eight pairs of adult blue jays (16 birds to-
tal). In an effort to maintain similar levels of motivation, we 
chose birds with similar body weights for each pair. We ran-
domly designated one member of the pair as the “subject” 
and another as the “stooge.” The pairs in this experiment 
(listed subject first) were: b22 and b18, b24 and b84, b70 and 
b1, b85 and b140, b122 and b3, b223 and b106, b229 and b130, 
b239 and b208. In referring to the pairs, we cite only the sub-
ject’s band number. 
4.2.2. A single trial 
To begin, we describe the sequence of events within a single 
trial, or play of the game. The computer illuminated the rear 
lights at the beginning of each trial, signaling that a new trial 
had started. When both subjects occupied the corresponding 
rear perches, the rear lights were “washed out” (by switch-
ing on an additional white light) to indicate the beginning of 
the intertrial interval. When the inter-trial interval expired, 
the apparatus illuminated the subject’s front lights, indicat-
ing that a choice (or play) had become available. The appro-
priate front light (as determined by the programmed strat-
egy) for the stooge illuminated at the same time. The trial 
only proceeded to this choice phase if both individuals occu-
pied their rear perches. Next, both birds hopped forward to 
one of the front perches; the apparatus extinguished the un-
chosen light and “washed out” the chosen light (as described 
above). Once both birds occupied their front perches, the ap-
paratus dispensed food according to experimentally deter-
mined game matrices. 
4.2.3. Game matrices 
During tests, the subject experienced the following Prison-
er’s Dilemma game matrix: 
 Stooge 
 C  D 
Subject 
C  4 Pellets  0 Pellets 
D  6 Pellets  2 Pellets 
Students of game theory usually think of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game as model of cooperation, so they customar-
ily called one action “cooperate” (denoted by C in the game 
matrix) and the other option “defect” (meaning “not cooper-
ate,” denoted by D). 
The game matrix shows how the subject’s payoffs de-
pend on the combined actions of the subject and the stooge. 
For example, if the stooge plays D and the subject plays 
C the subject obtains zero pellets (see Mesterton-Gibbons, 
1992 for a review of the game matrix and other ideas from 
game theory). During all trials, the stooge experienced a be-
haviorally neutral game matrix in which it obtained two 
pellets for all possible combinations of actions. The rea-
son for this was two-fold. First, it was an effort to maxi-
mize our control over the stooge’s behavior by offering the 
stooge the same motivation to act in all circumstances. Sec-
ond, the stooge would then obtain slightly less food on av-
erage than the subject, which again was an effort to ensure 
that the stooge was at least as motivated to act as the sub-
ject. We wanted to avoid situations, for example, in which 
the stooge was satiated (and so had a high latency to act), 
while the subject was still hungry. 
4.2.4. Mutualism precedes Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Game theoretical equilibria are stability concepts. To test the 
stability of cooperation, we sought to first create high levels 
of cooperation. To achieve this, we presented each subject 
with a mutualism matrix given by: 
 Stooge 
 C  D 
Subject 
C  4  2 
D  0  0 
which quickly led to high levels of the C response. Subjects 
experienced this mutualism treatment before each Prisoner’s 
Dilemma test, for a minimum of 3 days, terminating only 
when the subject showed 80% C or higher for two consecu-
tive days. 
Following the results of experiment 1, we arranged all 
trials into clumps of four. The birds waited 345 s and then 
played four times in quick succession with 5 s between 
plays. In addition, we arranged trials in blocks of 40 (10 
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clumps of 4), with 8 forced or no choice trials followed by 32 
free choice trials. During the forced choice trials, the appara-
tus presented only one option to the subjects (either or C or 
D), while the stooge continued to play its programmed strat-
egy (TFT or All-D). 
As explained above, the C and D choices were defined by 
their positions. The C choice was the perch closest to the op-
ponent, while the D choice was further away. In addition, 
we changed the color of the stimulus light associated with 
C and D for each accumulation/strategy treatment. We used 
four color pairs — yellow/red, yellow/blue, red/green and 
green/orange — chosen because they seemed about equally 
discriminable to a human observer. We randomized the 
color pair used for each subject in each treatment, assigning 
one of the two colors to C and the other to D. The stooge’s 
choice light was always green. 
4.2.5. Stooge strategy treatments 
As described above, the stooge implemented a strategy that 
we determined. We simply programmed the apparatus so 
that the appropriate choice (C or D) was the only one avail-
able to the stooge. For example, in tit-for-tat we programmed 
the apparatus to show the inside C light if the subject coop-
erated on the previous trial, and to show the outside D light 
if the subject defected on the previous trial. The appropri-
ate payoff matrix (mutualism or Prisoner’s Dilemma) de-
termined the subject’s payoffs, just as if the stooge had cho-
sen freely. When there were long programmed gaps between 
plays, such as from 1 day to the next, or over the mid-day 
break, the tit-for-tat player began by cooperating. 
4.2.6. Accumulation treatments 
In accumulated treatments, the apparatus held food in the 
transparent accumulator (Figure 1B) for a clump of four tri-
als, while in non-accumulated treatments the flapper was 
opened at the end of each trial, immediately after the pellet 
dispenser operated. 
4.2.6.1. General plan of a treatment. The general plan of a single 
treatment is straightforward. First, we randomly assigned 
stimulus colors, stooge strategy and accumulation treatment. 
Second, the subject experienced the mutualism matrix (with 
the chosen accumulation and stooge-strategy treatments in 
force) until the cooperation criterion was satisfied. Third, 
we changed the subject’s payoff matrix to the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma matrix, and this was in force until the subject com-
pleted 1000 free choice trials (5–7 days). We repeated this cy-
cle until each subject had completed all four accumulation/
strategy combinations. In a few cases, a subject completed 
less than 1000 free trials (never less than 700 free trials) be-
cause of an error in the program that managed the transi-
tions from one treatment to the next. 
4.3. Experiment 2—results 
Experiment 2 considered the effect of accumulation and 
strategy on the stability of cooperation, and we published 
the main results on this topic previously (Stephens et al., 
2002). This paper emphasizes unpublished results on the ef-
fect of temporal clumping, but we review the earlier results 
because they lay the groundwork for our clumping results. 
The basic result of the experiment was a three-way inter-
action between opponent strategy, accumulation and time 
block. This interaction showed that cooperation persisted 
when the opponent reciprocated (played tit-for-tat) and pay-
offs accumulated; in contrast, cooperation eroded toward de-
fection in other situations. 
As explained in the methods, our procedure clumped tri-
als (“plays” in game-theoretic jargon) together in time be-
cause experiment 1 showed that clumping enhanced the 
effect of accumulation on impulsiveness. Here, we ask 
whether subjects cooperate more on the first play of clump 
or on the second and so on. In this re-analysis, therefore, we 
conducted a large repeated measures analysis of variance, 
similar to the one used to analyze previously published data, 
except that we added “clump position” as a fixed factor. Ta-
ble 1 shows the resulting ANOVA table. The table shows 
the same pattern of significant and insignificant results as 
in our earlier published analysis, but also shows two signif-
icant effects that involve position within the clump: a signif-
icant main effect of clump position and a significant inter-
action of accumulation and clump position (codes ACCUM 
and CLMP-POS). Figure 5 shows the accumulation–posi-
tion interaction. The figure shows that subjects cooperate at 
roughly the same level in the first play of a clump regard-
less of whether payoffs are accumulated or not accumulated. 
However, the level of cooperation drops on the second, third 
and fourth plays of the clump in both treatments; however, 
this drop is larger in the unaccumulated treatments. A post 
hoc analysis using Fisher’s least-significance difference tests 
at the 5% level of significance suggests that the clump posi-
tions 2–4 in the unaccumulated treatments are a distinct sub-
set of the data with markedly lower levels of cooperation. 
The figure suggests a similar but more subtle decline in accu-
mulated treatments, but post hoc analysis suggests this is not 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The significant accumulation/clump position interaction 
(F3,21 = 7.83, p = 0.0011) observed in experiment 2. The plot shows the 
relative frequency of cooperation as a function of a trial’s position 
within a clump of plays (clump position). Subjects cooperated at rela-
tively high rates in the first trial of a clump, but the frequency of coop-
eration declined markedly on later trials in “Not Accumulated” treat-
ments. In “Accumulated” treatments, the frequency of cooperation 
did not drop significantly on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th trials of the clump. 
As in previous figures, this plot summarizes data from the final third 
of free trails for each treatment.  
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significant. Overall, this new analysis including the effects of 
clump position, suggests shows that the overall difference in 
cooperation we reported previously is largely due to differ-
ences that occur after the first play of a clump.   
We find that subjects cooperate more frequently after the 
long interval between clumps than after the short interval 
within clumps, and the drop in cooperation from the first to 
second play is greatest when we distribute payoffs immedi-
ately. We do not have a convincing explanation for this re-
sult, but we can offer two plausible interpretations. One 
possibility is that subjects simply forget their place in the 
intervals between clumps of plays, and this causes them to 
fall back to typical behavior, which tends to increase coop-
eration. Recall that our procedures start each treatment with 
high levels of cooperation, so that subjects have had more 
overall experience choosing the “C” option than the “D” op-
tion—therefore, forgetful subjects might return to the pre-
viously reinforced “C” option. The subject needs the first 
play in a clump to “jog” its memory before it begins to re-
spond appropriately to the opponent on the second play. 
In this view, the salience of actually receiving food in unac-
cumulated treatments jog the subject’s memory more effec-
tively than the visible but unavailable food deliveries of the 
accumulated treatments. The explanation works best for the 
tit-for-tat treatments, since it is somewhat unclear how a jay 
can “lose its place” in the all defect treatments where they 
should always defect as their opponent does. 
The second possibly relies on game theory. In the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, it can never be rational to cooperate when 
only one play remains, by extension game theorists have 
long argued that if two players know they will play a fixed 
number of times they should always defect (see Mesterton-
Gibbons, 1992 for a complete discussion). So a second possi-
bility is that subjects view the clumps of four plays like a fi-
nitely repeated game, in which they “know” they will play 
the game exactly four times. To explain a shift to defection 
within a clump of plays, we assume that a subject’s certainty 
about how many plays remain depends on the position of 
a trial in the clump. Psychophysics (e.g., Gescheider, 1985) 
tells us that the more plays remain, the more unsure the sub-
jects should be. Therefore, we would expect fairly confident 
defection on the last play of a clump. Intuitively the idea is 
Table 1. Repeated measures analysis of variance table of experiment 2 
Source                                                              Sum of squares                      d.f.                      MS                               F                                       p 
Strategy (STRAT) 19.0705 1 19.0705 71.6912 0.000063* 
   Error 1.8621 7 0.2660 
Accumulation (ACCUM) 2.1183 1 2.1183 5.1324 0.057862 
   Error 2.8891 7 0.4127 
Time block (BLOCK) 4.4122 2 2.2061 68.7237 0.000000* 
   Error 0.4494 14 0.0321 
Clump position (CLMP-POS) 2.2671 3 0.7557 11.4228 0.000118* 
   Error 1.3893 21 0.0662 
STRAT×ACCUM 0.0746 1 0.0746 0.2845 0.610253 
   Error 1.8350 7 0.2621 
STRAT×BLOCK 1.3544 2 0.6772 44.6636 0.000001* 
   Error 0.2123 14 0.0152 
ACCUM×BLOCK 0.2291 2 0.1145 1.6284 0.231290 
   Error 0.9848 14 0.0703 
STRAT×CLMP-POS 0.0884 3 0.0295 0.6735 0.577858 
   Error 0.9183 21 0.0437 
ACCUM×CLMP-POS 0.4376 3 0.1459 7.8305 0.001076* 
   Error 0.3912 21 0.0186 
BLOCK×CLMP-POS  0.0611  6 0.0102 2.0523 0.079710 
   Error 0.2086 42 0.0050 
STRAT×ACCUM×BLOCK 0.3225 2 0.1613 4.2382 0.036377* 
   Error 0.5327 14 0.0380 
STRAT×ACCUM×CLMP-POS 0.0792 3 0.0264 1.7342 0.190686 
   Error 0.3199 21 0.0152 
STRAT×BLOCK×CLMP-POS 0.0482 6 0.0080 1.6587 0.155185 
   Error 0.2033 42 0.0048 
ACCUM×BLOCK×CLMP-POS 0.0403 6 0.0067 0.6974 0.653061 
   Error 0.4049 42 0.0096 
STRAT×ACCUM×BLOCK×CLMP-POS 0.0327 6 0.0055 1.0398 0.413598 
   Error 0.2204 42 0.0052   
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that subjects “care about” the four-play future of an inter-
action at the beginning of a clump of plays, but do not care 
at all on the last play. This hypothesis does not explain the 
stepwise transition from the first to second plays as neatly as 
the forgetting hypothesis, although the forgetting hypothe-
sis, at best, explains only some aspects of our results. 
4.4. Experiment 2—Discussion 
Experiment 2 explored the role of accumulation and strategy 
in cooperation, and found – as previously reported – that co-
operation persisted in treatments where payoffs accumu-
lated and the opponent reciprocated. This paper shows that 
subjects cooperated most in the first play of a clump with a 
distinct drop in levels of cooperation after this when payoff 
did not accumulate. The effects of accumulation on coopera-
tion are due to differences that occur in the second, third and 
fourth plays of a clump. As in experiment 1, we see that tem-
poral clumping plays an unexpected role in determining the 
level of cooperation. 
4.4.1. Clumps and cooperation 
Our demonstration that cooperativeness varies with the po-
sition of a play within a sequence of clumped plays adds a 
new level of complexity to models of cooperation. Theoret-
ical approaches to cooperation in social dilemmas typically 
ignore the temporal organization of plays (see Stephens, 
2000; Stephens et al., 1995 for exceptions). For example, mod-
elers have advocated a great many strategies for the Prison-
er’s Dilemma (tit-for- tat, generous tit-for-tat, Pavlov and so 
on), but none of these strategies considers the temporal as-
pects of cooperative games. Moreover, we comment that nat-
urally occurring cooperative situations will be organized in 
time in many different ways. Some may have a clear bout 
structure, with bouts of play separated by long interval of 
non-play (e.g., two male manakins repeatedly dance for a 
female, but then wait a long time for the next female to ar-
rive). Others may have no specific temporal clumping, but 
have opportunities to play occurring randomly. The evenly 
spaced structure of repeated play tacitly assumed by most 
models of cooperation is perhaps the least likely possibility. 
Our results suggest that these arrangements may have im-
portant effects on the behavioral control of cooperation. 
We find that cooperation is a rather fragile phenomenon 
(Stephens et al., 2002). We had to construct rather specialized 
circumstances to generate cooperative behavior. To circum-
vent the problem of impulsiveness, we had to both clump tri-
als and accumulate payoffs. In addition, the jays had to play 
against strict TFT strategists. Although our clumped/accu-
mulated design does model some natural cooperative situ-
ations, it does not reflect all instances of cooperation. These 
experiments suggest that cognitive constraints such as im-
pulsivity may limit the role of reciprocity as a general mech-
anism of cooperation (Stevens and Hauser, 2004). 
5. General discussion 
We have considered the combined effects of payoff accumu-
lation and temporal clumping on impulsiveness and coop-
eration. Our first experiment shows that subjects were less 
impulsive when payoffs accumulated, but only when we ar-
ranged trials in clumps. We expected accumulation to re-
duce impulsiveness and reasoned that clumping would en-
hance this effect. Instead, our data suggest that clumping 
increases impulsiveness and accumulation eliminates the ef-
fect of clumping because jays were most impulsive in our 
clumped and unaccumulated treatment but about equally 
impulsive in all other treatments. 
5.1. Calculating long-term rates 
The first sentence of this paper defines impulsivity in terms 
of rate. We characterize an animal’s behavior as impulsive 
if it chooses a smaller more immediate option even when a 
larger more delayed option yields a higher long-term rate. 
Our clumped treatments raise questions about the meaning 
of “long-term rate” that do not arise in “unclumped” stud-
ies of impulsivity. Consider a self-control experiment that of-
fers an animal a choice between a small-immediate option, 
yielding amount A1 after delay t1, and large-delayed op-
tion, yielding amount A2 after delay t2. In addition, the sub-
ject waits for inter-trial interval τ between trials. The con-
ventional way to calculate the highest long-term rate is to 
compare: 
A1    and    
A2 
                                        τ + t1          τ + t2 
For a situation with evenly-space trials, the quantity Ai /
(τ + ti) is the rate calculated from one choice point to the next 
(the “choice-to-choice” rate) and the infinite time-horizon 
rate (the really “long-term” rate). However, if the inter-trial 
interval varies as it does in our clumped treatments, then 
the choice-to-choice rate and the long-term rate are not the 
same. In our clumped treatments, with clumps of four trials, 
the inter-trial interval for the first trial is 345 s, followed by 
three very short inter-trial intervals of 5 s. So the choice-to-
choice rate for the first trial in a clump is Ai /(345 + ti), while 
the choice-to-choice rate for the second trial in a clump is Ai 
/(5 + ti), but the long-term rate is necessarily the same for 
all trials. The long-term rate is Ai /(90 + ti) because the aver-
age inter-trial interval is 90 s, 1/4 × 345 + 3/4  × 5 = 90. We 
designed our study so that the long-term rates, measured in 
this sense, were the same in our clumped and unclumped 
treatments. 
We comment that one can calculate a different average 
rate using a weighted average of the choice-to-choice rates: 
1/4  × Ai /(345 + ti) + 3/4 × Ai /(5 + ti). Most students of 
feeding behavior now agree, however, that averaging the 
time and amount components separately and then calculat-
ing the quotient of the averages gives a more meaningful es-
timate of the long-term rate. Specifically this quotient of the 
averages measures the rate of gain in a typical unit of time, 
while the weighted average of choice-to-choice rates gives 
the rate in a typical trial. The literature of rate-based foraging 
models contains extensive discussions of these issues (Bate-
son and Kacelnik, 1996; Stephens and Krebs, 1986; Temple-
ton and Lawlor, 1981; Turelli et al., 1982), but there seems 
to have been little discussion of the problems of calculating 
rates in a variable world in the literature of impulsivity. 
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If one accepts that long-term rates, as explained above, 
provide the appropriate standard against which to recognize 
impulsivity, then there can be little doubt that the observed 
increase in choice of the small-immediate option in clumped 
treatments represents a change in impulsivity because the al-
ternatives in our clumped and unclumped treatments pro-
vide the same long-term rates. 
Even if we agree that the long-term rate provides the cor-
rect standard of comparison for the definition of impulsivity, 
a critical reader might ask whether our subjects responded 
to choice-to-choice rates. This might explain the shift toward 
the small-immediate option in clumped treatments because 
the small-immediate option often provides a high choice-to-
choice rate in clumped treatments. However, if choice-to-
choice rates governed our jay’s choice behavior we should 
have observed different behavior in the last trial. Specifi-
cally, we would expect preference for large-delayed in the 
last trial of clump and preference for small-immediate on the 
first, second and third trials. As reported above, experiment 
1 found no effect of clump position on choice behavior. So, if 
sensitivity to choice-to-choice rates influenced our jays, they 
made a mistake by over-emphasizing the three trials that oc-
cur in quick succession and underemphasizing the long-wait 
to the beginning of the next clump. 
5.2. Limitations and further questions 
As with any novel result, one must ask how general these 
clumping effects might be. To answer this question, we need 
further studies on the effects of clumping on impulsive-
ness. Our studies differ from most studies of impulsivity be-
cause we ran 8 h sessions and subjects obtained nearly all of 
their food from the apparatus. In this procedure, a session 
fills an 8 h day and trials occur on a longer time scale than 
in more common open economy procedures. A clump of tri-
als may be a more salient feature of our long sessions than 
it would be in typical open-economy procedures. Assuming 
for the moment that further studies validate our clumping 
result, we want to know why it occurs. The hypothesis that 
variability in the inter-trial interval (clumping) increases the 
background value suggests several further studies. An obvi-
ous question is whether random variation in the intertrial in-
terval has the same effect as the deterministic variation we 
have studied. 
Similar concerns arise in connection with the clump-po-
sition effect on cooperation that we report. It is striking that 
we do not find similar clump-position effects in experiment 
1, where we focused on impulsiveness and not cooperation. 
Of course, a key difference between the studies is that the 
stooge’s experimentally determined strategy creates sequen-
tial relationships between successive plays. Manipulations of 
the stooge’s strategy and interval between clumps could be 
revealing here. 
5.3. Summary 
We present two experiments that investigate the role of pay-
off accumulation and temporal clumping of trials in impul-
siveness and cooperation. Our results show that clumping 
makes animals more impulsive, but that payoff accumula-
tion can eliminate this effect. Although animal impulsive-
ness is a widely studied phenomenon, we believe that this 
study is the first to report this clumping effect. In addition, 
this clumping effect is one of only two results showing that 
aspects of the choice background can influence impulsive-
ness. We also show that cooperativeness varies with the po-
sition of trial within a clump of trials. Taken together, these 
results suggest that temporal clumping and related issues of 
the temporal organization of the choices may provide impor-
tant new insights into impulsiveness and cooperation. 
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